Law Text Culture
Volume 21 Law as ... Minor Jurisprudence in
Historical Key

Article 3

2017

How Strange the Change from Major to Minor
Peter Goodrich
Yeshiva University, New York

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc

Recommended Citation
Goodrich, Peter, How Strange the Change from Major to Minor, Law Text Culture, 21, 2017,
30-53.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol21/iss1/3
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

How Strange the Change from Major to Minor
Abstract
The lines from a Noel Coward song provide the appropriately melancholic and suitably ambiguous title to
an excavation of the ontology of the minor. Associated theologically with the abrogation of all law, the
minor is the child, play, the modal chord that challenges, subverts and displaces the certainty of the major
key and black letter law. A minor jurisprudence is argued here to be a lifestyle that challenges the extant
legal form of office, the establishment as doctrine, the stasis and complacency of the institution.
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How Strange the Change
from Major to Minor
Peter Goodrich*
The celebrated Wits of the MISCELLENARIAN Race, the EssayWriters, casual Discoursers, Reflection-Coiners, Meditation-Founders and
others of the irregular kind of Writers may plead as their particular
Advantage ‘That they follow the Variety of NATURE’ (Shaftesbury
1714: 95).1

An essay on the minor ought to be short, and yet I hope to fail in
that as well. My argument will be that minor jurisprudences are in the
best of senses lifestyles, existential modes of inhabiting institutional
space, and that they entail an open, plural and expansive thinking. The
rumination of evoking minorist positions takes patience, care, time.
So start with a non-definition. The goal of a minor jurisprudence is to
cut holes in the fabric of law. The minor, aligned to the peripheral, the
marginal and modal affect in music, if authentic, has to create a site
of temporary evacuation, by which I mean an avenue of withdrawal
and return, of exchange, and thereby the expression of a novelty in the
putatively closed skein of legal rules. It is necessary to tear the seamless
web. To break the strands that trap and hold the imagination in the
dead zone of a sticky and immobile lex, the iron cage of a putatively
comprehensive rule, decision, or other major mode of code. The minor
rends, and thence performs a rendering through which the excluded,
the others of law, the laws of others, and in methodological terms the
peripheral passions, enthusiasms, tones and relationships, movements
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and moods, potentially intervene as critique in law. What is sought is
precisely the transitivity of fabrication, the event of spinning the web,
the practice of making, the invention of the strands that bind and leave
adrift. There is the goal, the future of the minor, in its alternation of
the major mode, in the past that was discarded, the practices that were
denied, the strangers who were kept out. It is necessary first to step
back, to withdraw a bit, to subtract from, to find a space and so assess
the connotations of a minor jurisprudence through the concept of its
minority.

From the Latin minus, minor is smaller, or less, the equivalent
of parvus. In transitive mode, minuo, means to make smaller, to
subtract from, but intriguingly the primary meaning in medieval
Latin is Franciscan Friar, frater minor, while minorissa refers to a nun,
a minoress, and by extension to humiliation – minorativus and so an
exclusion, a diminution and dismissal. Finally, minoritas means under
age, preceding majority.2 It is the latter juristic meaning that is listed,
for instance, in the Manipulus vocabulorum (Levins 1567: 110.8). The
lesser, the minor, is attached to the major and as Partridge excavates
the etymology, it complements magister, from magis, and thus minister
from minor, as someone who assists in governing ‘a religious cult, a
public office, finally one at the head of a political department – cf
“minister of religion” or “of the Crown”’ (958: 406). The trajectory of
the minor, at least linguistically, is towards the major, the magister
(the magistrate) but not the maximus because sovereign, state or hieros
is that from which the lesser, the servant, the official in his officium is
subtracted and placed. In another variation, ministerialis also leads from
public official to minstrel and minstrelsy, the music of office, the tone
of governance, the rhythm of decision. In musical theory the minor
mode was attached most usually to a softer and more melancholic tone,
to cantus mollis and by extension, if it is a minor jurisprudence, to ius
mollis. The beige and brown tones of the Franciscan frater minor, who
has given up all possessions and all temporal law, who is happy to be
less than, and withdrawn from, can be heard reflected in the affect of
the minor modality and keys (Lester 1989).
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It is in that crucible of theologico-juridical meanings that the
potentiality of minority subsists in the present possibility of taking away
from, abrogating, suspending, unfinishing. To the monumental quality
of hierarchy, and to the musical mode of durus, the affect of a harsh and
inflexible tone, the minor counterposes a modest movement within law,
away from law, in the resuscitation of lesser writings, a legal scholarship
with passion and, to coin a term, a jurisprudence of minumenta. The
term, to be precise, is found in a writ of commission in William West’s
Symboleography and references a list of diverse testimonies and written
proofs of ownership (1601: 192 verso).3 The glossographer and barrister
Thomas Blount lists miniments as the evidences of all kinds of writings
in the legitimation of legal title, and I would add, now, much later, in
the making of a juristic point, in the advocacy of the minor, of the rend,
and of the open (1670: s.v. miniments).4 The minor is the crack in the
edifice, the fissure in discourse, a site of incompatibility and novelty
that Foucault more patulously termed the diffraction of discourse.

Oh to go back, to break the self, to collide with an autobiography,
mine or another, or better a collective autogeny, a generic bios that
writes, that is thought.5 So I will not retrace my own minor path, the
tracks of the traceless. I have inhabited the minorist office in my own
way, in the space of my idiosyncratic fabulations. I have laughed at,
with, against, and as the law. So where else, where new to start? What
minstrelsy of beginning, what minor chord will please the horde? The
answer, for me in my withdrawal, at the point of opening, seems to be
in childhood, in minority as subtraction from, going back, withdrawing
so as to redraw, to begin again, to act differently. The technique is that
of destruam et aedificabo, translated into method as the deliberation on a
minor past, a past of minority, and its erasure by the affects and forms
of my major modality. Common lawyers have their inverted version
of this genre of approach expressed in various versions of the maxim
in majore summa continentur minor – the greater contains the lesser,
the major includes, absorbs and governs the minor (Coke: 1611, 5:15).
The principle has a secondary and more directly political expression in
the maxim in praesentia majoris potestatis, minor potestas cessat – in the
presence of a greater power, the lesser power ceases. The higher office
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carries with it the minor – magus dignum trahit ad se minus dignum
(Coke 1629: 43). In all of these maxims, and the list could be lengthily
expanded, the red letter type prolonged, the logic is one of subsumption
and subordination, the minor is included in the major, the lesser is of
significance only in becoming part of the greater but is nothing of itself,
a point made poetically and in extremis, in the familiar and extant legal
maxim de minimis non curat lex, which reads most usually as trifles,
affects, little things, unusual acts that can be ignored as lacking legal
legitimacy, as not being ‘acts in law’.
The consequence of this logic of the greater, of the major premise, is
that the minor is included in the mode of exclusion. The ex-ceptio, the
exception in Agamben’s lengthy elaboration is the invariant strategy
whereby ‘something is divided, excluded, pushed to the bottom, and
precisely through this exclusion, it is included as archè and foundation’.
(2015: 264) It is thus not simply that the numerically superior is
preferred but that the minor has neither jurisdiction nor status in the
common law tradition: a minor cannot agree, cannot hold property,
cannot govern, or act as a guardian, and is not to be believed when
giving evidence without corroboration. Technically the minor is alieni
iuris, in law but out of law as being in the power of another. Such is
the view of the minor from the perspective of the major, its inclusive
exclusion being predicated upon the tutelary status of the origin as
juvenile, as lacking reason and capacity, as mere fact, inchoate, nascent
and as yet, not yet. The initial feature of the minor is thus relational,
what used to be termed dialectical, and resiles upon a looking back, a
perspective constituted by and in relation to the major and thence the
maximal as sovereign and sacred.

Minority, and here I borrow, for want of ambition, for loss of
direction, from Deleuze, ‘minority has no model, it’s a becoming,
a process’ (1995: 175). It is in this view non-conformist, creative,
and committed to fabulation. While that challenge to structure and
to dogma is important, I am initially more interested in taking up
the opening, the site and space of the minor as the point of internal
contestation of doctrine, the alien within, the foetus in the heart of the
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present. From the perspective of the master and the major, of the old,
of the law, minority is disempowered, fickle, unrestrained, unserious,
purely emotive and so to be tolerated but constrained and on occasion
protected or punished. The minor is technically in the wardship of the
adult guardian, the parent or parent’s surrogate who acts as the minor’s
trustees. What, however, of the minor from the space of minority?
The minor exists nonetheless as the possibility of the major, it subsists
as the ever present, emotive and unstable space of autobiography, of
attachment, of an interior sense as visceral memory attached to inchoate
promise, as image and relationship, fantasy and play. The child, as Freud
would have it, is parent to the adult, mother to the woman, father to
the man, and also, in an enigmatic sense, as I am arguing here, the
unacknowledged author to the law.

Embedded in nascence, in the inchoate and imagistic domain of
infancy, in the reverie of the body and in play, the child is a figure of
creativity, a symbol of origin and of invention. That the child has no
office and is not a person in law invokes an often remarked, distinct
though limited sovereignty of the infant, a theatre of freedom that has
as its initial defining features the inhabitation of images rather than
language, desire as opposed to restraint, and fiction as the mode of
the real. The knowledge of the child is pure experience in the mundus
imaginabilis which in classical thought mediates between the sensible
and the intelligible, and, to borrow from Aristotle, ‘nihil potest homo
intelligere sine phantasmate’ – without imagination, nothing can be
understood (1993: 24-26). For there to be law, there has to be desire and
it is precisely in remaining in desire, staying with the phantasm, that
promotes passion and facilitates action. It is in that space of fabulation
that the minumenta of jurisprudence get written and the minor as project
takes up its juristic place. Homo ludens lies at the origin of homo juridicus.
Literally, which is here to say in the imagined corpus, and legally, as in
the materiality of the corpus iuris.
Start with the latter, with youth, image, body and desire in the
law. Youth is defined by Aristotle as passion, as wanting too much, as
imagination, image and play which gains a limited legal recognition in
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the early concept of youths desiring, in love with, or in one translation,
enthusiasts for law – juventuti cupidæ legum.6 Jurisprudence is for
Justinian written for youth, for minors, and it is in its classical form
a pedagogy of institutionalization that channels the desire of the
student into the art and artifice of the trinity of persons, things and
actions – bodies, relationships and sacraments, in the theological argot,
from which the divisions derive. The development of the subject and
of the institution are parallel rather than different. The model for this
symbolic permutation or second birth into law is theistically driven:
‘The most private, the most intimate, that which is at the core of the
very concept of the subject, to know the fantasm, is already marked
with the institutional seal of genealogy. Every subject carries within
him, if I can put it that way, the institution in the primary form of the
institution of the family’.7 The Law of culture precedes and dictates the
temporal law. There is, in sum, a doubling of minority and of subjection
in relation to two parallel authorities, oikonomic and public, private and
sacred. The latter is instituted in the form of entry into the text, and
according to Justinian the Institutes were a cradle of the law – cunabula
legum – opened up for you by the light of ‘our imperial splendor’, and
so as to instill the principles of a universal legality in the heart of the
subject.8 Resistance is futile.
The nascent legal subject learns to be a child of the text, meaning
of the majesty and sovereignty of a divinely promulgated scripture.
The instituted legal persona is an obedient minor, bearer of a filial fear,
afraid of hieros and divinity, reverential towards the professors, faithful
to the laws. It is classically made explicit that it is a crime to play or
make jokes (ludos) about those who teach the law for the reason that
‘this material will have been composed by the supreme indulgence of
the Deity … consecrating as it were a fitting and most holy temple of
justice (sanctissimum templum iustitiae consecrare)’ (D. liv). Elsewhere
in the Digest, acting or performing on stage is banned as a crime
punishable by civil death (infamia), along with brothel keeping as
another erotic and indictable art (D. 3.2.1).9 Ulpian is later cited to the
effect that athletes were not performing as actors, and that musicians,
charioteers and those who administer public games also escape the ban.
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The latter, the administrators, according to Celsus, are not practitioners
of the banned and banishing theatrical art because they perform in the
course of their office (ministerium) and not in the mode of players or
practitioners of artem ludicram.

The attack upon the incidents of minority, upon play, levity, jokes,
upon all unofficial reveries and fabulations is found at the very start
of the Corpus Iuris, in its minority, as it were, as its minor key, though
one could equally turn to the invocation of divinity and majesty in
the preamble to British Acts of Parliament. The transmission of the
major modality, the white keys, into the common law tradition comes
again and directly in the insistence upon sombre tone, downcast mood,
melancholic deportment and proper decorum which is explicit in the
early modern tradition. The third dictate of the law of nature, according
to the Stillingfleete’s Irenicum of 1662, is that ‘all things … belonging
to the Government of Society, be performed with the greatest solemnity
and decency that may be’ (1662: 93). The ‘evil spirit’ according to the
same source, is marked by ‘the bleaknesse and turbulency of passion, as
[also] the faint gleams of Lightnesse and Vanity’ (More 1662: 1 & 15).
Enthusiasm, according to a source contemporary with Stillingfleet is
the sibling of atheism and is a distemper occasioned by melancholy, a
flatuous and spirituous inclination and in all probability excess of wine
(1662: 96).10 It is the law of solemnity, in any event, that dictates the sites
and spaces of worship where grave and austere genuflection evidences
that the appropriate honour and reverence are given to the divinity.
The same mode and model applies to law in the exceptional form of the
rules – if such is not too strong a term for these inventions – governing
summary proceedings for contempt of court.

To understand the modality specific to law one can move from
the theological dictates of the lex divinae, to the rules of respect, the
prohibition of levity and requirement of reverence in the courtroom.
The liturgical character of trial has stringent rules beginning with
the assertion that ‘the punishment of contempt is the basis of all legal
procedure’, as intoned in the first modern treatise on the topic by Sir
John Fox. It is certainly relevant to note the origin and continuance of
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this primary and radical aura of sanctity and its dictate of ceremony
that accompanies both the court and its dramatis personae (1927: 1).
The ban on disrespect – the common law abhors contumacy – and the
summary punishment of any levity, mockery, satire, and playfulness
not administered as part of a court office or ministerium, institutes
directly an atmosphere of gravity, deference of behavior, deflection of
emotion and suppression of affective relationships. The root, as I have
adumbrated above, is theological and the early case law confirms this
in two modes. First, according to Bracton and instantiated in medieval
decisions on scandalizing the court, the root of this ‘unwritten’ rule,
this natural law of governmentality, lies in Roman law and specifically
in the sacred character of all things public. For the common lawyers, it
is the majesty of the crown, the dignity of the sovereign and the priestly
character of the judges that institutes the comparably somber affect
and mode that envelops the spaces and the ministers – historically the
sacerdotes – of law.11 Contempt of court, contemptus curiae, is contemptus
iustititiae, and originally incited capital punishment because ‘there is
no greater crime than contempt … for all persons ought to be subject
to the King as supreme and his officers’.12

That the institution of deference – one might say of deferring, of
endlessly postponing minority – is the founding ground of hierarchy
and a first principle of legal dogmatics can be evidenced by the second
feature of the law of contempt, which is that it is an unwritten law. It
takes the form of a structure, a law of nature that is ‘as much a part of
the lex terrae and within the exception of Magna Charta as the issuing
of any other legal process whatsoever’.13 The exception referenced was to
the extant and continuing common law, to which unwritten tradition
contempt belongs as coeval with the courts themselves, and instituted
in the indefinite time of antiquity against novelty, which indefiniteness
has ‘no priority or posteriority to be discovered about it and therefore
cannot be said to invade the common law, but to act in an alliance and
friendly conjunction with every other provision which the wisdom of
our ancestors has established for the good of society’.14 In dogmatic
jargon, nullum tempus occurit Regi, time does not run against the King
(Coke, 1629: 273).15 In other words, there is no source but rather an
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unwritten tradition, an image of the image to be protected, which
Blackstone captures rather brilliantly in stating that ‘the Judges of the
Court upon testimony of their own senses, shall decide the point’. The
example Sir William gives, is of youth, or in the colorful legal argot,
‘non-age’ as an object of sense that can be tried by inspection and the
irrefragable proof of ‘ocular demonstration’.16 Size matters. The sense
of minority makes sense of the minor as something excluded.

In the later case of Almon, the Chief Justice makes an equivalent
diagnosis, though somewhat differently, in stating that the law of
contempt requires that ‘homage and obedience [be] rendered to the
Court’. There is the phantasm of law, in the decorum of the court and
the regalia and other indications of majesty that attach to the ambulant
personage of the judges and other ministers of the sovereign. There too,
in those bodies, lies the site of desire, the world of juridical imagination
in which the body of the judge accedes to the mediation of the reverie
of images and the synesthesia of presence. The insistence upon the in
vivo character of trial and the aura of judicial sanctity plays a crucial
role, and institutes an affective space or major key into the context and
interlocutions of the courtroom. A liturgical space is a separate one in
which rule, life and affect are solemnized and joined together.

The upshot, my point your honors, the trajectory of this outline of
the control of manners, the dictation of honour and homage, humility
and minority in the face of law’s liturgical presence is to argue that
hidden in this office, the minus of the ministerium, the worm in the
brain of legal being is precisely the persistence of minority, the alien
desire within, the jurisdictions of other discourses and other laws –
of space, of love, of movement, of sense, of images, of play – in the
interstices of legality, meaning in the body that makes and here that
is devoted to studying, that teaches, which is to say reproduces laws
in their increasingly diverse forms. It could be argued that a minor
jurisprudence is written for other legal scholars, that its teaching is
confined to professors and their doctoral students, to trainee academics,
the children of Socrates, but if it is to be meaningfully political it
has also to address body and desire in the training and practice of
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lawyering. The minor jurisprudence, mos minorum iuris docendi, must
address the minors.

Quietude, somber dress, melancholic deportment, abstention
from drink and from sex, avoidance of games, tobacco, drugs; keeping
early hours, a shaved face, routine and unending study are all express
desiderata of the early manuals of legal pedagogy in which, as Fulbeck
puts it, ‘law and religion do lie down together’ (1829: 2). Even up until
the 9th edition, Glanville Williams’ Learning the Law, a popular text for
youth desirous to study for a law degree, stipulated that dark dress and
somber manners were the appropriate decorum of the law student. It
is not, however, the express representation of the desired somatic body
and deportment that is at issue but rather the mode of instituting, the
method of inculcation which disciplines and solemnizes the subject,
and which above all instills the chorus of juridical emotions. How to
tear a hole in the cribbed and cabined constraint of legal affectivity? A
beginning can be made by returning to an early minor jurisprudence,
the work of a philosopher poet who moved to study law and attend
the Inns of Court. Abraham Fraunce, in a largely forgotten work on
legal logic makes the immortal point that the flaw in legal method, in
the training adopted in the Third University as it was then called, the
Inns of Court, which were the only place formally teaching substantive,
Anglican common law, was closure: ‘you would love the law, but sine
rivali; you would reign, but alone, hinc illæ lachrymæ’ (1588: fol. 3
recto).17 He found, in this book of logic as pedagogy, that the legal
discipline was estranged from the university, and its practitioners a
clique, a rabble of tenurists, that neglected not only method but even
their own history and concepts as encapsulated in their peculiar diction
and their misprision of their legal words of art.18

At the root of Fraunce’s critique of the clique, the harpies of the law
courts, the most unlearned of the learned, is the diagnosis of an error
in the relationship to legal minors, the students of law who receive no
adequate education, no viable instruction in the mos britannicus, because
they study only confused cases in the arduous yet cloistered context of
apprenticeship and practice in the Inns of Court. Their pursuit of law,
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of a singular law, of a practice, is rote and venal, a formality and not a
passion, a means and not an end. The result is likely as not confusion
rather than creativity, compliance, timidity, and frequently depression.
Vico can provide further support in his lectures on education where in
the sixth oration, agreeing with Fraunce, he states of legal study that
‘here there are tears, here there is misery’ (1993: 126). The immediate
reference is to parents who force their children into the study of
jurisprudence to bring honor to their family, and for financial gain. He
proceeds to argue ‘that as long as the respect due their fathers binds
them, they continue to pursue those studies unwillingly and with
disdain and do not cultivate them either seriously or with enthusiasm’.
Only once the bond of ‘filial devotion’ is thrown off, and only if the
neophyte persists in law, is there any chance of developing a passion,
engendering enthusiasm, and having learned nothing the first time
round, starting again, and learning for herself.19 Only through a species
of rebirth, a resistance to institutional conformity and the norm of the
major, of the contemporary version of the law and the prophets, can the
possibility of playing the jurist, in Olivia Barr’s terms living with the
law, performing the office of a critical legal scholar, in its necessarily
minor key, come into being.20 The symbolic permutation has to be
matched to an imaginary permutation and the minor allowed the
expression of their affective mode and minority.

Returning to the concept of the minor, childhood is when we grow,
become and become ourselves. It is the dominion of the imaginary,
the ius quaesitum alteri, the space of inventively phantasmatic relations
to the social and the site of prefiguration. There are returns to infancy
and rebirths, as Vico indicates but the key lies in the attributes of
origin and origination, novelty and becoming. A minor jurisprudence
is minor first, as Dorsett and McVeigh’s elegant study of Salmond
copiously implies, because it is written for and taught to minors. It is
a pedagogic text for students: ‘The general audience for jurisprudence
was for the most part students who would take up positions of office
within institutional life’ (2007: 778). Even here, the trajectory of the
audience is likely at this stage of development in the main antithetical
to, if not hostile towards, the minor jurisprudence expounded by
40
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the practitioners of minumenta, whose evidencing of law and title is
through diverse writings, through an interdisciplinary and figurative
imagination in the apprehension of the alternate realities or plural
forms of legality. The practitioner of a minor jurisprudence identifies
with minority and faces various modes of antipathy both from the
minors, the students, their charges hurrying to office, emplotment and
employment, and from the institution, for not conforming to the law
and prophets either in style or in substance. A marginal position in
the academic institution, escape to adjoining humanistic disciplines, a
divided identity, isolation or depression can frequently ensue, although,
ironically it is frequently the passion, the commitment, the enthusiasm
of the critical legal scholar and the diverse race and gender positions
that have followed from it that are most threatening and uncomfortable
in the persona of minority.

Identifying with the minority is primarily what Deleuze and
Guattari reference as qualifying the status of minor languages and
minor literatures, although they also suggest ‘juridical and political’
implications. The minor does not exist in itself, but only in relation to
the major, although this bifurcation is complex in that the minor is
a deterritorialized language, a literature of the outsider, a continuous
‘becoming of everybody, one’s potential becoming to the extent that
one deviates from the model’. For them the minor can become major
because the essence of minority is ‘a determination different from the
constant … a subsystem or an outsystem’. 21 This is generally framed
as some version of the critical jurist’s dilemma.22 For Barr this is posed
in terms of a choice between escaping the law or learning to live with
it.23 The latter is interpreted as taking responsibility for one’s office,
the practice of law. The Swedish jurist and singer Elisabeth Eneroth
elaborates upon this sense of responsibility, the ethical substrate of the
critical jurist’s minor role, by way of developing a model for justification
of action ‘in the sense of care for the reasons for a certain interpersonal
course of action’ within the ambit of applying the law. 24 To Deleuze
and Guattari’s binaries, reversals, antinomies and dialectical switches, I
would suggest instead a focus upon this lex caritatis, upon an erudition
in eroticis, as Nietzsche framed it, one which walks slowly and attentively
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in the space of amity and desire as they play out in relation to and as
juridical practice. If the minor is an inconstant state of becoming, the
unfinished project of a jurisprudence to come, then it implies both a
‘minorization’ and imagination, the will to fabulation, the autonomous
gesture of a legal fiction concerned with the not yet, with forces as yet
undetermined and relationships still to be built.

If the minor is not to be entirely oppositional, if it is to take its place
as part of the legal institution it requires its own positivity. Critique is
admirable as far as it goes, as method, as the child on the back of the
norm, as rectitude of practice, but its tendency is to remain critique ‘of ’
rather than substantive expression. To add something akin to an office
of the minorist, a jurisprudence that is both pre-law and in law, is to
invoke the radicality of the child, the force of the inaugural in the free
play of thought. Barr suggests responsibility, and Eneroth advocates
care and the building of trust through the practice of justification. These
are facets of a humanistic project and of an equitable orientation, part
of the spiritualia of office that perhaps gains its exemplary expression in
the ordo minorum of the Franciscans as recently excavated and expatiated
by Coccia and Agamben. The object of the order was life itself as the
first law, wherein living lawfully was the primary dictate of practice:
rule is life and life is rule being the constituent element of what I would
propose as an emergent mos minorum.25 Legal precepts become vital
precepts: ‘A law that is indeterminated into life has as its counterpart,
with a symmetrically inverted gesture, a life that is totally transformed
by law’.26 Acting becomes writing, life becomes law.

The mos minorum has the virtue of what St Francis famously coined
as regula non bullata, meaning rule without papal Bulls, the absence of
any pontifical authorization, and so a voluntary jurisdiction, persuasion
through action and not legislation. This means a withdrawal from
law, abrogatio omnis iuris, in favor of life, in honor of all things in
common, in praise also of worms.27 The minorization of law into form
of life, and rule into vital precept also greatly expands the meaning
and expansiveness of right as a shared or common sense, an allencompassing synesthetic openness to the dominion of experience.
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Jurists, however, are no longer cenobites. The history is important
mainly for another reason, which is related to the alternate potential
of minority, the commonality of the child as vital expression and
as opening through withdrawal, suspension and inhabitation of the
institution of thought in the mode of singular universality, inscription
that takes place impersonally, affectively, openly.28

Alongside the cenobitic tradition and the mos minorum of the ordo
fratrum minorum, there is also the history of the minority of women
which I took, years ago, in the last flings of love and youth, as the
exemplum of the minor (1996; 2006a). The voluntary jurisdiction of
the courts and laws of love offers an opening into a law of imagination,
a surprisingly contemporary experiential and relational casuistry, an
amatory set of affective precepts and practices whose guiding principles
were visceral and libidinal and most definitely regula non bullata in
that the Tractatus de amore was banned.29 The case where the glossator
Symphorianus expressly mentions the concept of minor judgments –
minoris iudiciis – as the apposite definition of decisions taken, involves
an encounter between lovers in the woods. She was playing with friends
and he surprised her with a kiss to the hem of her dress. Such was his
passion and her surprise that she fell to the ground and exposed her
petticoats. She complained to the court of the Mayor of the Woods
that the behavior was uncouth and upsetting. She received favourable
judgment which was upheld on appeal to the High Court of Love (1731:
47). The judgment was founded on Ovid: who is counting how many
times I have kissed your clothes?30 The decision was that greater care
should be taken by the lover in approaching his inamorata. She did
not like surprises and so she should signal that she knew and assented
to his sartorial embraces. Passion could follow after honorable amends
had been made.
The interest, the force as opposed to the credit, of the example
lies in its imaginative and imaginary character. It creates and opens a
world, the enduring discourse on the practices and purviews, relational
intricacies and affective conflicts, the beginnings and endings of the
amicable and amatory domains that we still inhabit. It is minorist in
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multiple senses all associated, or so at least I have labored to argue,
with childhood, with aspects of childishness here viewed positively and
actively as the core, the opening of being and so equally, by extension,
as the libido, the energy in jurisprudence. I will list these facets as a
kind of manifesto for the child, for the alieni iuris in the sui iuris and
as the best available indication of possible futures:

1. I am hesitant to put the record straight, for fear of being correct,
for the lack of seriousness of it, but the subtitle of Law in the Courts of
Love, was ‘Literature and other minor Jurisprudences’. The minor is
plural, but who reads to the end of a subtitle or bathes in milk any more?
Symphorianus also stipulates the plurality of minority, its many courts
and judgements. In being nascent, in becoming, the child is exuberantly
several and a jurisprudential office of the minorist is similarly a multiple
and floating event. No major reinterpretation, no great ark and covenant
of a Kafkaesque ‘literary continent’, just an enthusiasm for the several
and a recognition of minor and plural beings. Then decisions have to be
made. The minor can be radically evil, dangerous, tortured, or open and
full of aura and potential, fantasm and truth for you. Take your pick.

2. To be done with leaders, with above and below in thought. The
judgment of love is predicated upon a non-coercive jurisdiction, absence
of validity, whatever that most dubious of jurisprudential terms is taken
to imply, in favor of mediation and remediation, the lex caritatis of
facilitating relationship, trust, amity and amor. Minor jurisprudences,
the offices of the minorists are here those of acting plurally, of becoming
ears and performing the auricular tasks of transmitting the demands of
desire, the passions and enthusiasms of minor causes in the pedagogic,
tutelary, and practical institutional sites that we inhabit. Gnome for
the gnomes, as it were, at least as a motto, as an ethically appropriate
start. The site of judgement, to make the case, lies in the subject object
relation as the fulfillment of a ligamen, a bond, a love between the
parties, not one or the other but the phantasm, the ‘nova persona’ that
is the imaginary product of their conjunction. The object of decision
is the phantasm seen as the collective site of the union of subject and
the active intellect.
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3. The offices of minorists are always uneasy because littoral and
liminal. The art of subtraction, the dilemma of withdrawal resides in
the institutional dissonance of action. Re-emergence involves existential
and political exposure, the taking of a stand in thought, facing up to
being faced off. Joining the collectivity of thought is a dangerous activity
for a jurist because it potentially weakens the discipline, the brand,
and reveals the arcana iuris or mysteries of governance as inhabited
in university settings. The jurists enjoy what in the old language of
advowson are benefices, livings, and in that ecclesiastical sense seek to
maintain the separateness of their persona, technically ideona persona or
proper person, and the justification of their investiture in the benefice
by virtue of Aetas, Scientia, Mores et Ordo – age, learning, morals and
degree in law. The minorist, seeking through a moment of withdrawal
a connection to an earlier or simply different state of disciplinary and
existential being, the chronological and ebullient theoretical positioning
before of before the law, has to withdraw, retract so as to uncontract,
so as to question and thereby inhabit the phantasm of both being and
being in an institution.
4. The major can be minor because the foetus invariably remains
present at the heart of being. My favorite example is that of Lord Rogers
in a case involving the meaning of the word family in the Rent Act.31
Could a homosexual couple legally be husband and wife? This may
seem obvious, but the case is initially heard in England, at the end
of the twentieth century and, as one Law Lord put it, to term a same
sex couple husband and wife would be ‘to read “black” as meaning
“white”, [and] is self-contradictory and a nonsense’. To which Lord
Rogers replies that the Act requires emendation for failing any longer
to reflect the intentions of the drafters. Their thought must be rendered
anew and for this it required a return to Selden’s Queen of the Sciences,
philology, and specifically to a lecture by the poet and Cambridge
classicist, A.E. Housman on ‘The Application of Thought to Textual
Criticism’ (1962: 142). Hardly a valid source of law and yet here an
especially appropriate aid to judgment in its address of emendation of
corrupt texts. Poetics to the rescue of law, a mixing of jurisdictions
so as to create a novel application and allow new personae into the
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web and worms of norms. Housman argues that ‘the prime requisite
of a good emendation is that it should start from the thought’. Lord
Rogers, himself a scholar of Roman law, walks through the hole that
he has cut in the fabric of law, while leaving Housman’s ‘addle-pates
and impostors’ to maunder and lie. More than that, just to accelerate
a sense of the ethics of the minor, the emendation of the statute, as
its wording relates to homosexual partners, is occasioned through the
textual criticism of a gay poet’s theory of corrupt texts and even worse
manners. Touché.
5. Minorists are hedonists, that at least is my claim for the sense
of critical minorism as the opening to expression of believers in the
enjoyment of thought, the pleasure of joining in thinking as the form
of life of a discipline outside of any individual ambition, project or
career. It is the practice of thought, the ambulatory idea, the shared
character angelicus of the intellect that is the site of withdrawal, the
point of tension and release. Enthusiasm is the term that Shaftesbury
begins to expound in a profane sense and as against the pontifications
and other regulae bullatae of conformism and rote. The minorist is
true to their Daimon, the outside within, the process of thought as
attention to phantasms as the objects of intellection, the mixing of
passion and imagination in the ambulant activity of the academic
form of life. Shaftesbury tells the story of an itinerant enthusiast who
was imprisoned and placed in solitary confinement without company
or light. ‘In this banishment from letters and discourse, the man
very wittily invented an amusement much to his purpose and highly
preservative of health and humour … he tuned his natural pipes’ so
as to form all sorts of ‘articulate voices’ (1999: 128-29). When he was
released he composed a philosophical treatise on the topic of voice and
sound. A minor work but one which evinces both the maintenance of
enthusiasm in compromised circumstances and the will to think actively
in confinement. An instance of the Well Tempered Clavier, the genius of
a major composition that alternates in minor keys (Manderson 2001:
4-21). Don’t stop.
6. I have said much about the attributes of image and imagination,
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phantasm and enthusiasm as the media of the child, and as the avenues
of invention, the tools of creative thought for the minorist. These
aspects of phantasy and play of imagination in thought, of thinking as
participation in the perambulation of a collective reverie in its various
modes and inspirations gains another minor expression in the concept
of fiction or Deleuze’s fabulation. The latter term has the advantage of
connoting fabrication, figure and making, and suggests a last though
not lasting image of the minor in Quintilian’s Declamationes minores. 32
These were in the main exercises, legal arguments as to hypothetical
conflicts in the future and fictive tense. Potential lawsuits and their
rhetorical and often humorous argumentation. Pro and occasionally
contra, but never to judgment. Quintilian taught, in this genre, the
free flow of future ideas, the passages of thought and their modes
of advenience. The latter term, adveniences, according to Barthes, are
points of attraction, images and ideas that ‘set me off’, that advene and
transport (1974: 19).33 The image that advenes is one that instigates an
adventure in thought, a haptic and incomplete becoming, the minority
of an idea helped on its way.

To cut a hole in the fabric of law is to insist upon more than law
within the institution of legality. The hole, rend or tear that is made
by the minor, by commitment to minority, thus turns minorist offices
against the comfort of the constant and the habitus of habit. The minor
practice exists so as to let the phantasm through the breach and in doing
so breaks down the abstraction of the legal norm. Figures, dramatis
personae – same sex married couples, Persian cats, malapropisms,
allegories on the Nile, long forgotten genders and denizens, King
Canute, lines and apparatuses – emerge in the space of judicial judgment
and their accompanying corridors and choral opinions. The minor,
the child, threatens to make law real and all too human. Alternately,
precariously, the minor is an ontology in law, a visceral mode of
occupying an institutional space, a lifestyle in contestation with a form
of life. As ontology, as minor gesture, singular life, there is a sense of
resistance, of interruption and of puncturing that veers away from the
abstraction and mere, because closed, epistemology of law.34
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Endnotes
∗ Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law and Visiting Professor, School of
Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi. My thanks to my critics,
Emanuele Coccia, to Adam Gearey, Olivia O’Barr, Chris Tomlins, Rivka
Weil and the anonymous reviewers for the Journal.

1. I insist on using the earlier edition because I happen to have it, but more
because modern editions do not reproduce the emblemata that Shaftesbury
was at pains to include, and also dispense with the typography of the earlier
editions, as if images and orthography were entirely dispensable to the
operation of signs. On which, see Felix Paknadel (1974: 290).

2. In addition to Lewis and Short (1958), see Baxter and Johnson (1934).

3. The term minumenta is found in William West (1601) at 192 verso, where
proof of ownership in Chancery can be through examination of ‘minumenta,
scripta, recorda, transcripta, territoria, chartas, ac alias evidentias …’
4. The 1672 edition of John Cowell’s Interpreter [1610] edited by Thomas
Manley carries the same definition.

5. On the generality or impersonality of thought, drawing on Averroes, see
Emanuel Coccia (2005) and also Roberto Esposito (2015).
6. This forms the last line of the dedication to Justinian’s Institutes and is
generally not glossed. See Pierre Legendre (2007); and the excellent study
of images and childhood by Vicky Lebeau (2008).
7. The concept of symbolic birth is taken from Alexandra PapageorgiouLegendre (1990) 56-65.

8.

Institutes Proem.

9. Discussed in Goodrich (2006) s.v. law.

10. Discussed, opposed, ridiculed in Anthony Ashley Shaftesbury (1714)
63-70.

11. Henry de Bracton, [c.1250] (1958) 127b. The filial fear of law and the
designation of judges as sacerdotes, as holy men, comes from Sir John
Fortescue, De Laudibus legum Angliae [c 1460] (1998) though we find it
in varying forms in all of the subsequent pedagogic texts.

12. Bracton (1958) vol. 3, 368 can also be accessed through http://bracton.
law.harvard.edu/Framed/mframe.htm
13. The King v Almon 97 Eng. Rep. 94 [1765].
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14. The King v Almon, at 99. (Almon, a bookseller, had criticized Lord
Mansfield for a decision relating to the English radical and Parliamentarian
John Wilkes).

14. On the implications of the maxim, see Grenville Sharp (1779).
Intriguingly, and supportive of Bataille’s theory of the child as sovereign
in their limited kingdom, it is also a maxim of law that prescription does
not run against a child.
15. Sir William Blackstone, [1765-69] (2016) vol. 3.22, 218-219 discussing,
appropriately enough the proofs of the non-age – the minority – of the
cognizor, ‘or to set aside a statute or recognizance entered into by an infant’.

16. I should note, accuracy requires it, honesty comports with it, that there
is a recent edition of the Logike which appeared in 2013, edited by one
Steve Sheppard, but it begins in conformity with my sense: ‘As a matter
of legal history, the work is now largely unknown’.

17. Fraunce (1588) preface. For more on this theme, to avoid repetition, see
my ‘A Short History of Failure’ in Languages of Law (1992); and, of course,
because I mentioned him in the last footnote, Steve Sheppard, ‘Abraham
Fraunce, Legal Analysis, and Legal Scholarship’, the Introduction to the
2013 reprinting of a facsimile edition of The Lawiers Logike (Clark, NJ:
Lawbook Exchange, 2013).
18. In slightly more contemporary terms, see Fiona Cowney (2004) which,
based on surveys, finds that the primary reason for studying law was to
please the parents.
19. O. Barr, (2016) 61, defining jurisprudential office as ‘the practice of a
lawful life’.

20. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia (London: Athlone, 1987) at 105. My commentator of choice
on Deleuze and the minor, an informed and intellective minorist, is
Edward Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze: The Expression and Representation
of Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
21. Karlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) ix: ‘[I]f
law is a coercive and, at least in this sense, repressive order, how can a legal
scholar, conscious of this fact, justify her own activity, which necessarily
contributes to the reproduction of this order?’.
22. O. Barr, Movement, 59.
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23. Elisabeth Eneroth, Critical substantive validity testing of legal norms
(Stockholm: Jure, 2016) 16.

24. Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, Expositio super regulam, (éd. par D. Flood,
Wiesbaden 1972) 117: Regula et vita fratrum minorum, vocans eam non
solum regulam sed et vitam, ut sit sensus quod est regula, id est recta lex,
et forma vivendi … Cited in Emanuel Coccia, ‘“Regula et vita”: Il diritto
monastico e la regola fanscescana’ 20 Medioevo e Rinascimento (2006) 97,
135.
25. Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life,
86.

26. The root is St Augustine though see also Nicola Masciandaro, ‘Womsign’,
in Scott Wilson (ed.), Melancology: Black Metal Theory and Ecology (London:
Zero Books, 2013) 81.
27. Should it be relevant, the notion of impersonality references the escape
from persona that minority implies and that universality – everyone
and no one, an escape from the One – dictates. See especially Roberto
Esposito (2015).
28. For details, see P.G. Walsh, ‘Introduction’ to the translation of the Tractatus
de amore: P.G. Walsh (trans.), (1993).
29. Ovid, Heroides, 19.31.33

30. Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2001] 1 AC 27 (HL).

30. The most recent translation by Shackleton Bailey, published in the Loeb
Classical Library, is published as Quintilian (2006).

31. Dynamically recuperated and discussed in David Panagia (2016) Thesis 1.

32. On which, see Erin Manning (2016) 7: ‘This capacity to actualize, at the
edge of the virtual where the actual is not-yet, is what makes the minor
a gesture …’
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